The political process now underway in Khartoum – in its current form – will not lead to a radical solution to the Sudanese crisis, but it is a step that could open the door to a solution, if it builds on the gains that can be achieved in the negotiations.
March 21, 2023 Juba – South Sudan
Interviewed in Juba: Mr. Shawki Abdel Azim
1/ What is the SPLM’s position on the current political process in Sudan?
The political process now underway in Khartoum – in its current form – will not lead to a radical solution to the Sudanese crisis, but it is a step that could open the door to a solution, if it builds on the gains that can be achieved in the negotiations.
2/ Why doesn’t it lead to a radical solution?
If we look at the parties and blocs participating in this process, we find that the FFC Central Council signed an agreement with the military leadership represented by General Burhan and General Hemedti, and if we examine this agreement that was signed well, we will find that it is empty of any content, and it avoided discussing the basic issues and the roots of the issue causing the Sudanese crisis, but rather postponed it to the future as it always happens.
3/ What are the main issues avoided in the framework agreement?
For example, the issue of the relationship between religion and the state, the security sector and how the relationship will be between the army and other military components present in the arena, the issue of identity, addressing the distortions and imbalances in the Sudanese economy. etc.) While the political forces avoid the root issues, they enter into conflicts and disagreements among themselves, if you analyze them, you will find that they are disagreements over superficial issues. Look at the conflict between (Freedom and Change Central Council – Freedom and Change Democratic Bloc), it is a disagreement over minor issues and far from the issues that can move Sudan from war and instability to a new Sudan.
4/ It is noticeable that Leader Abdel Aziz al-Hilu – or the SPLM-North – focuses on the issue of the relationship between religion and the state, despite the existence of many other issues. Is there a solution to the Sudanese crisis?
Very simply, we ask – is it possible to move from the old Sudan with all its baggage (wars, refugees, displacement, hatred and loathing between peoples and nationalities, etc.) to a new Sudan under a religious state? Can the advocates of democracy, justice, equality and the rule of law achieve their demands under religious laws that differentiate between citizens on the basis of belief? And in the shadow of a religious state in which those who embrace the state’s religion, whether Christian or Islamic, are not equal to those who do not? When Turabi failed to reach power through political discourse during the days of the Charter Front, he switched to religious discourse, and the Salvationists consolidated themselves in power by using religion and ended up in corruption and exploitation of people. In short, if you believe in African beliefs, or join the SPLM, even if you are Muslim or Christian, the theocratic state sanctions your blood, property and honor. If Sharia law is applied, it will inevitably divide citizens into “people of the tribe, people of the dhimmah, and infidels,” and Muslims themselves are often discriminated against if they do not agree with the religious doctrine of the authority. With this situation, how can a state of peace, stability, development, justice, and prosperity be achieved? Those who suffered from the fire of the religious state in the old Sudan must come out and declare their demand for a state of equality, justice, citizenship, and law. They should reject the religious state that has harmed them over the past 30 years.
5/ Don’t you think that the SPLM has been repeating the rhetoric of the secular state at the level of negotiations and intellectuals and has not made enough effort to come down to the people at the level of the general public and the bases?
Of course, this is not true – we made a very great effort to raise awareness about secularism, but the Sudanese were subjected to intellectual terrorism under the salvation government, which put up many barriers using religious discourse that was harnessed by all the state media, while other voices were opened (ghost houses), and the discourse of the SPLM remained the most exposed to combat and exclusion and was portrayed as that of a group against which jihad must be declared. However, our vision on the relationship between religion and the state has found interest from citizens who suffer from discrimination based on religion, and from those who call for a new Sudan in which the values of (equality, justice, truth and freedom) prevail – we have published booklets containing this vision, and there are many groups working to raise awareness of the movement’s vision.) – even in Khartoum.
6/Why is the SPLM demanding secularism in the transitional period and not waiting for the elections to be chosen by the people of Sudan?
People always respond to the trick used by traditional forces or sectarian parties that promote during transitional periods the need to transfer basic and fundamental issues to an elected government. Because of this trick, the Sudanese people wasted five transitional periods, and now four years have passed since the fall of al-Bashir, and the fifth transitional period has begun, during which not a single fateful issue has been resolved. Elections often bring in parties that have no interest in “real change” – and the first thing they do is stabilize the contentious issues that caused the crisis. They hand over power to religious parties through elections. In transitional periods, the laws of the “religious state” are always applied. How can we expect these religious-based parties to establish a non-religious system of government that contradicts their original project?
7/ If secularism is not adopted during the transitional period – does this mean that the elections will not be fair?
We call for the transitional period to be a foundational platform where everyone is equal, where every group can present their speech freely and respectfully. Sharia laws by their very nature criminalize the speech of others and can go to extremes in rejecting it. Therefore, I repeat the question to the advocates of democracy. How can the principles of democracy be applied in a transitional period in which secularism is not applied? Or in a state that does not respect human rights and freedom of expression and categorizes citizens based on religion? This is enough for the elections not to be fair and lead to the preservation of the old state and the continuation of the crisis.
8/ Is your disagreement with an Islamic theocracy that rules by sharia, or with a theocracy at all?
The SPLM’s position on the theocratic state is consistent because it oppresses its citizens and differentiates between them according to their beliefs, whether they are Muslim, Christian, Hindu or any other religion. We believe in the establishment of a democratic system of government that allows everyone to perform their religious rituals with respect and equality. A system of government based on scientific foundations and subject to correction, revision and development. It applies the values of freedom, transparency and human rights and is accountable to the citizens who elected it. This cannot happen in a state that relies on a religious authority or a divine mandate, no matter how well intentioned it may be.
9/ Is the SPLM committed to the Framework Peace Agreement it signed with the Chairman of the Sovereignty Council, General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, in March 2021?
Al-Burhan overthrew the Declaration of Principles itself, which no longer exists because of the October 25 coup, and even before the coup – Al-Burhan withdrew from the negotiations and left the SPLM delegation at the table. This was a prelude to the coup, as he immediately began to make military preparations and mobilize troops as soon as he withdrew from the Juba platform. Evidence of this is that he upgraded the military units in South Kordofan – for example, the 53rd Brigade in Abuja was upgraded to a division called the 10th Division – as well as upgrading a battalion in Habila to a brigade, upgrading the Kartala Company to a battalion, the Fio and Mardis Companies to battalions, and so on – all in June of 2021. Although the deadline for handing over power to civilians had already passed, the most important reason for the October 25 coup was the repudiation of the Declaration of Principles signed in March 2021. That was the main reason and goal of the coup.
10/ Why do you think that after Burhan signed the agreement willingly, he staged a coup to repudiate it?
The main issue was (secularism) – the separation of religion from the state – which we talked about in the agreement. They signed the declaration whose most important clause was (separation of religion from the state). It later turned out that they signed it only to gain time, and we discovered that they agreed to it deceptively to remain only on paper and not implemented, as is the habit of Khartoum governments in breaking covenants. Al-Burhan signed the Declaration of Principles with the SPLM to remain on paper, and tore it up in the coup to avoid paying the peace dividend.
12/ What is the role of the Popular Movement in the revolutionary movement in Khartoum, which declined significantly after the coup? Why do you think this decline?
After the coup, the government declared war on us by declaring a state of emergency and gave the security services (army, military intelligence and other agencies) free rein. For us, the state of emergency is tantamount to a declaration of war.
12/ Is the SPLM still committed to negotiating with the civilian government that will result from the political process currently underway in Khartoum?
If the political process succeeds in ending the coup and forming a civilian-led government, we will negotiate with it, because the SPLM is fighting for a just cause. If there is a way to solve it through the table and negotiation, there is no objection to that – there is no need for war.
13/ Do you have contacts and consultations with the political forces involved in the political process in Khartoum?
In January, we met with a delegation from the National Umma Party led by Sadiq al-Mahdi and discussed the political process, the existing crisis, and how to reach a solution. In February, we signed a political declaration with the original Democratic Unionist Party and the Freedom and Change Forces (Democratic Bloc).
14/ Signing a political declaration with the Democratic Bloc has created great confusion in the political environment, especially among the anti-coup political forces, resistance committees and others?
What is the issue with signing an agreement with the Democratic Bloc? It may be because many people view the Democratic Bloc as having supported the October 25 coup and is now working with the coup government. But everyone knows that the Popular Movement stood against the coup, as I pointed out in this interview.
We have already signed an agreement with Burhan himself (a declaration of principles), so what is the issue if we sign a political declaration with the Democratic Bloc? This is a focus on the husks of issues.
15/ But you signed with Burhan during the revolution and when he said he supported the revolution and democratization, not after the coup.
First, all political forces in Sudan are considered stakeholders or have a responsibility to correct the current situation in order to get out of the crisis. Secondly: Talking about the banana sit-in, coup plotters … etc. is useless. The Freedom and Change itself took over the leadership of the revolution after April 11, and negotiated with the military and handed them power under the constitutional document as partners in government. The FFC shared power with the military, and now, after the October 25 coup, they are negotiating with the military and signed the Framework Agreement with them – so who is better than who? We believe that we need an agreement that includes everyone while rallying around the New Sudan project that puts an end to the crisis from our point of view. We do not differentiate between political forces, except for the old forces that caused the current Sudanese disaster.
16/ Will signing an agreement with the Democratic Bloc contribute to resolving the current issue?
Yes, because the Democratic Bloc agreed with us on the principles that lead to ending the issue.
17/ Have they agreed to the principle of ending the coup that you are demanding?
They agreed to base the constitution on the principle of “separation of religion from the state,” which is an end to the coup in our view, and they also signed (decentralization, security and military reform, integration of the RSF into the army, democratization, etc.) Everything in the political declaration that was signed will end the coup.
17/ Was the issue of ending the coup referred to directly in the debate or was the movement content with the Democratic Bloc’s agreement to the principles that end the coup?
In the beginning, the SPLM did not join the democratic bloc, but the movement won the democratic bloc for the New Sudan project and our vision to get out of the current situation
including ending the coup. It is these principles that will end the coup. We will work with the Democratic Bloc to market the political declaration and lobby to convince the military of the principles contained in the declaration.
19/ What is the SPLM’s vision on the issue of integrating the movements’ armies and the RSF into the Sudanese army?
Integrating the armies created by the National Congress in its war against the SPLM is a priority if we want a solution to the Sudanese issue. All of them should be transformed into a single army that abides by one law. This is one of the basic principles of building a stable state. We mean these armies (the RSF, the armed movements that signed the Juba Peace Agreement, etc.). These armies must adhere to a new combat doctrine and the role of the army that will be stipulated in the permanent constitution.
20/ What is the fate of the SPLM army, will it be integrated into the army?
The SPLM has not yet reached a peace agreement with the government, so this condition does not apply to it now.
21/ If the SPLM signs a peace agreement, would you agree to integrate your army into the Sudanese army?
If we agree – there must be a unified army, but this army must be based on new foundations, first and foremost (reforming and restructuring it). If this is achieved, the SPLA will merge with the Sudanese army.
22/ The Popular Movement will hold its general conference soon, what is new about this conference?
The SPLM calls for a new, secular, democratic and decentralized Sudan that respects human rights and the basic principles of democratic practice. This conference is an opportunity for the SPLM to reaffirm its commitment to democracy and provide a model for political parties in Sudan and the Sudanese government itself, that it is necessary to have a peaceful transfer of power through the popular will. Indeed, the movement has established a civil authority in the liberated territories, through which we have tried to reflect the principles of the new Sudan, consistent with what we propose in our political discourse.
23/ Can the leaders and groups that left the SPLM return and end the current state of fragmentation?
Fragmentation is a general phenomenon in Sudanese politics and is not exclusive to the SPLM. As is known, all political forces and even civil society organizations have been affected by this disease resulting from the dysfunctional political structure of the old Sudanese state, and if it is not treated and corrected, the state of divisions and fragmentation will continue, and there will be no unity – look at the large parties such as the Umma Party, the Democratic Unionist Party, which are old forces and have qualified cadres, but were not spared the phenomenon of fragmentation due to the methods of the old regime that used the policy of “divide and conquer”.
24/ Do you have contact with your “comrades of yesteryear” or is the road closed, and is there any chance of unity between you again?
Those factions went back to Khartoum and participated in power. Now they are very close to the decision-making centers, and it is difficult for them to give up those positions and return to the SPLM.
25/ Do you mean landlord?
Malik Agar, Yasser Arman and others who were given positions or positions in the state. Most of them are now part of the authority and part of the machine that runs the scene.
26/ Do you communicate at any level?
None – they are preoccupied with power and its privileges.
27/ Finally: Commander Abdelaziz al-Hilu did not visit Khartoum until after the revolution, why?
For me, Khartoum is not a city, but a symbol of the power of the old regime – a symbol of the violence on which the Sudanese state has been based since its inception, a symbol of the lack of respect for human rights and the right of others to be others. It is not the geographical Khartoum consisting of Haji Yousef, Ombada, Jabruna, Diyum, and Khartoum 2.
28/ In what condition can Commander Abdelaziz al-Hilu visit Khartoum?
When Khartoum changes and respects the values of freedom, justice, equality, and the principles of human rights.
Thank you very much…
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