*Details of tribal and party meetings since 2019 to install Hemedti as president of Sudan, Misseriya tribe (3)*
By Dr. Mohammed Osman Awadallah
31/12/2024
In the first installment of this article, we cited two sources documenting the efforts to implement the scheme to install Hemedti as president of Sudan. We also mentioned the delegation led by the head of the Rizeigat tribe, which traveled in one trip to seven tribes to ask for their support and participation in the scheme. We promised to mention in this episode the efforts made to polarize the tribes. We devoted the second episode to the Hassaniya tribe in Khartoum and this episode to the Misseriya tribe in West Kordofan state.
*RSS contacts with tribes to polarize them in favor of Hemedti’s scheme to install Hemedti as president of Sudan*
Hemedti or his brother Abdulrahim Daglo contacted a number of tribal emirs and mayors. They asked them for three basic requests in exchange for the RSC responding to all the tribe’s requests and distributing late-model vehicles to all the tribe’s mayors, chiefs and emirs.
The quick support requests are:
1/ Announcement of twinning between the designated tribe and the RSF.
2/ The appointed tribal leadership declares its loyalty and support for the RSF.
3/ Take the Pledge of Allegiance.
This communication was partly secret and partly public, but it reflects very clearly the main plan and efforts to gather support and tribal loyalties to form an incubator as one of the requirements to prepare for Hemedti’s inauguration as president of Sudan.
Reactions varied, some rejecting outright, some hesitating, and some agreeing. In this section, we review the detailed information of Hemedti’s meeting with Misseriya tribal leaders.
*Hemedti invites the Misseriya tribe to join the scheme to install him as president of Sudan
Hemedti himself took on the task of recruiting the Misseriya tribe to his scheme to install him as president of Sudan. He penetrated the tribe through four main entrances. The first entrance is the civil administration, the second entrance is the professional youth unions, the third entrance is the Attawa Foundation, and the fourth entrance is the Qaht parties, especially the Umma Party in the state.
*First, Hemedti’s polarization of Misseriya civil administrations
About three months before the outbreak of the war, Hemedti invited more than 40 Misseriya leaders to meet with him in Khartoum under the pretext of tribal reconciliation. The delegation, which included three Nazirs, Nazir Mukhtar Babu Nimr, Nazir Abdelmonem Musa al-Shwain, and Nazir al-Sadiq al-Harika Ezzaldin, traveled to Khartoum. The delegation included three deputy Nazirs, namely Deputy Nazir Bashir Ajil Godallah, Deputy Nazir Mohammed Ahmadiya, and Deputy Nazir Ismail Hamidin Hamidan. The number of mayors is 15 mayors and 9 tribal notables, and the Misseriya Unity Committee has 7 members and 3 members related to the economy. Hemedti dropped the delegation off at the Coral Hotel, formerly the Hilton. However, it turned out that Hemedti used this delegation as a cover for another goal, which is to polarize the tribe for his scheme to install him as president of Sudan, and he is not interested in this meeting except for the three chiefs and their three proxies. Hemedti held a closed meeting with the Nazirs and their deputies and reached understandings with them that ended with the Nazirs and their deputies swearing allegiance to Hemedti while the other members of the delegation were completely absent. Thus, Hemedti achieved his maximum goals from the meeting. However, the tribe was forced into a tunnel of loyalty to the RSF, as its leaders took an oath of allegiance to Hemedti that became a sword hanging over their necks. This oath has been mentioned by a number of leaders. Most recently, Hemedti’s advisor and supervisor of Kordofan states, Hamid Hamdeen al-Nuwairi, known as al-Mizan, mentioned it in his recent recording from Kampala. The main role of the nazirs and deputy nazirs was limited to mobilizing local support for the militia, exploiting the status of the native administration to mobilize the Misseriya people in panic, and finally recruiting mercenaries from the Nuer tribe.
*Secondly, Hemedti’s polarization of Misseriya youth
Hemedti took advantage of the existence of a youth body affiliated with the Professionals’ Assembly, known as the Petroleum Fields Youth Assembly in West Kordofan state, which is headed by a cadre of the Umma Party known as Wad al-Qadi. It is headed by a cadre of the Umma Party known as Wad al-Qadi. This group was no longer acceptable to the grassroots due to the general failure of Qahat and its governments. Three months before the outbreak of the war, Hemedti maneuvered to reconstitute this body. He invited more than 600 young people from the Misseriya tribe to Khartoum, under the pretext of reconstituting the Oilfields Youth Committee. He personally supervised their hosting, organized their meetings, and then elected the Petroleum Fields Youth Steering Committee, which consisted of 12 sticks, headed by a person named Nawar, deputized by Fadal, and Fadalallah was chosen as the treasurer. After the conference, the 600 participants returned to West Kordofan State, while the 12 members of the executive office remained and held all their meetings in Hemedti’s office in the Republican Palace. They remained in Khartoum for three months until the war, in which they personally participated and were part of the RSF force that attacked the Republican Palace.
*Third Attawah Foundation*
The initiative formed a foundation, the Attawa Foundation, with the aim of coordinating between the tribes under the Attawa to mobilize support for Hemedti. Misseriya youth delegated three of them as representatives of the Misseriya tribe in the Attawa Foundation, which was officially registered and whose executive office is headed by Hamid Hamdin al-Nuwairi al-Mizan, along with Saleh Juma and Bakri al-Bargo as representatives of the Misseriya, while three others, Juma Daglo, al-Kanin and Yusuf Ezzat, are representatives of the Rizeigat. We note the importance of this body for Hemedti’s inauguration project, as the members of the executive office of this organization include two of Hemedti’s advisors, Hamid Hamdeen and Yusuf Ezzat, as well as Hemedti’s uncle, Juma Daglo.
*Coordination between Hemedti and the leaders of the Misseriya tribe:*
Leaders of the Umma Party, headed by the head of the national party, Fadlallah Barmah Nasser, son of the tribe, and Hassan Sheikh al-Din, Secretary General of the Umma Party in West Kordofan State (West Kordofan). Al Umma Party cadre and the head of the judiciary in the militia’s civilian administration, the son of lawyer Mohammed Ibrahim al-Ahmar. Another Umma Party leader named Tabaq (Kadad). And the head of the Umma Party in Muglad, Hammad Khater Jumaa. And the leader of the Umma Party, a professor at Babanusa University, Mayor Hamed Osman. And the Baathist Daker and Baathist Muhammad Bakkar. All these party leaders are the main actors in favor of the militia within the tribe.
Through these three approaches, Hemedti was able to find a foothold within the Misseriya tribe, polarize its sons, bind its leaders to an oath of allegiance, and use them all as fuel for the war. The results were disastrous for the tribe, considered the biggest disaster in its history due to the number of deaths that exceeded tens of thousands.
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